

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT		
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7. SOURCE: <b>CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT</b>		
15. SUMMARY:		(Leave Blank)
<p>(C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured on 18 January 1968 and concerns fragmentary notes, made by an U/I individual, on actions within the VC organization and in the military and political fields.</p>		
<p>(C) Following is a full translation of a captured enemy document which contains information on a VC activity plan. This document was captured on 18 January 1968, in South Vietnam (AQ755106), by 413th Scout Co, 23d Inf Div, RVNAF II CTZ. The document was received at CDEC on 24 January 1968, and was summarized under CDEC Document Log Number 01-2286-68 in Bulletin No. 9184 dated 25 January 1968, (IR Number 6 027 0819 68).</p>		
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DD FORM 1396

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 6 027 0789 68

PAGE 2 OF 7

PAGE

ORIGINATOR

COMUSMACV (CDEC)

(Leave Blank)

CDEC Doc Log No. 01-2286-68

FULL TRANSLATION

[Page 1 of original text]

Launch heavy attacks in order to destroy the enemy; material resources; capture high ranking enemy cadre and simultaneously attack American installations. Besiege and isolate American strong points; limit the US soldiers' movements and capture them to demand compensation for war damage.

Properly manage the timely take over of GVN administration and organize a government.

Develop political and military strength.

Stabilize the population's standard of living and establish ground and air defense.

Ideology.

- Heighten the determination to fight the enemy and make sacrifices for the main cause.

- Be extremely careful in fierce attacks.

- Make great efforts to attack the enemy.

- Heighten the sense of discipline.

Analysis of the enemy situation.

[One line missing]

[Page 2 of original text]

- The morale of the American and Puppet troops is poor. One half of the enemy troop strength [200,000] were annihilated in 1967.

- Anti-war sentiments; demands for repatriation and disobedience of commanders' orders occurred in some enemy units at company and battalion levels.

- The enemy soldiers were afraid of our main force. Therefore they left behind their wounded and dead companions-in-arms and chose to surrender. The satellite troops maintain a neutral attitude toward us.

- The combat tactics of the Americans required large expenditures and resulted in nothing but defeat.

3- Pacification program.

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(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 6 027 0789 68

PAGE 3 OF 7

PAGES

ORIGINATOR

COMUSMACV (CDEC)

(Leave Blank)

CDEC Doc Log No. 01-2286-68

The enemy pacification program completely failed in Bình Định and Phú Yên. Discords occurred in the enemy ranks after the elections.

In short, the enemy is suffering heavy defeats and has been driven to the defensive position.

In the dry season of 1967-68, the enemy will not have the capability that they had before. It is possible that they will launch operations at two old objectives.

4- Efforts have been made by officials of the American State Department to seek contact with us, but our indifference isolates them.

New salient points.

- The defeats suffered by the enemy in the battle of road # 9 and in the delta areas of Region 5, N Bô and TN [possibly Nam Bô and the Western Highlands] have not been reported to the Political Staff Section.

- Concerning the enemy pacification program; the Political Staff Section guessed that the enemy would resort to the double encirclement plan; but instead, the enemy had to defend his strong points in the cities.

- At present, the enemy is in a strategically defensive position.

[Page 3 of original text]

Motivation.

- We have not yet made the people clearly understand the Revolution's situation.

- The ideologies of reliance and "wait and see" have not yet been solved.

- Indignation of the enemy has not yet been motivated.

- The methods of motivating each specific group [minorities] have not been carried out.

Missions must be carried out.

a- Motivate people to answer the appeal of the [Liberation] Front concerning the Winter-Spring [Campaign].

b- Increase the people's resentment of the enemy. Efforts must be made to carry out the following:

- 1- Protest the [high] cost of living.  
Counter the enemy conscription.

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT NO. 6 027 0789 68

PAGE 4

OF 7

PAGES

ORIGINATOR

COMUSMACV (CDEC)

(Classification and Control Markings)

(Leave Blank)

CDEC Doc Log No. 01-2286-68

- Protest the killing of two monks in February 67.

2- Prepare a political plan and policy.

- c- Prepare the forces.

- d- Urge the people to actively struggle against the enemy without having fears of being captured.

- g- Prepare a large meeting during the Têt festival.

Possibly: use verbal propaganda or leaflets [for the following]:

1- Appeal to our comrades.

- [Liberation] Front's policy line.

- Policy of the local (RVN) administrative proselyting section.

- Leaflets should focus on the high cost of living, enemy conscription and religious oppression.

2- Focus on the above problems to motivate the people's opinion against the enemy.

3- Organization.

- Have firm control over the Ng [sic] youths, students, and trade unions.

- Lead and guide the people's struggle.

In short, the plan of activities should be carried out in two phases.

First phase. From now to 20 Jan [possibly 1968].

Second phase. From 20 Jan to Têt.

Specifically:

1- From now to 20 Jan, the TD [poss. battalion] should maintain liaison and reconnaissance regularly.

- Depending on the area, we should use verbal propaganda to create a press opinion against the enemy.

- Actively prepare strong positions and clearly master 3,000 [not very legible] persons.

2- Launch armed operations and make efforts to perform the proselyting mission.

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT		
CONTINUATION SHEET	CONFIDENTIAL <small>(Classification and Control Markings)</small>	REPORT NO. 6 027 0789 68 PAGE 5 OF 7 PAGES ORIGINATOR COMUSMACV (CDEC)
<p>CDEC Doc Log No. 01-2286-68</p> <p>2- <u>Construct two positions:</u> North and South [sic].</p> <p>Complete the construction of corridors and underground bunkers with entrance and exit points by 20 Jan.</p> <p>3- <u>Methods to motivate the people to rise up.</u></p> <p><u>Clearly understanding the requirements.</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Maintain the determination to fight and [sustain] love toward the people.</li> <li>- Have a large number of personnel.</li> <li>- Motivate the people to rise up when the firing has started.</li> <li>- The people must be armed with weapons and organized into groups.</li> </ul> <p><u>Missions:</u> Besiege the enemy agencies, capture tyrants [RVN officials], disarm police, annihilate [one word illegible], call for [the enemy to] surrender, and support other hamlets and objectives.</p> <p>The people's force must stop the enemy when they launch attacks against us.</p> <p><u>Organization:</u> The assault unit and the youths should seize enemy weapons to equip themselves.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Organize the people into close groups with good leaders and guides.</li> <li>- Choose hamlets to organize secret organizations and profit from the youths, students and public organizations.</li> <li>- Rapidly seize loud speakers and other facilities. Unit: From Hoàng Diệu direction, right Phan Chu Trinh [sic].</li> </ul> <p>NV [sic] occupy hamlet, capture tyrants, disarm, and check roads.</p> <p>[Page 4 of original text]</p> <p><u>Four major tasks.</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1- Resolutely achieve the ultimate victory.</li> <li>2- Destroy or disintegrate the Puppet Government and Puppet Army.</li> <li>3- Annihilate the US troops and all their mechanical facilities.</li> </ol>		(Leave Blank)
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## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 6 027 0789 68

PAGE 6 OF 7 PAGES

ORIGINATOR

COMUSMACV (CDEC)

(Leave Blank)

CDEC Doc Log No. 01-2286-68

4- Continue to attack the enemy in the event they counter-attack.

Five principles.

- 1- Make maximum use of all military and political violence.
- 2- Insure a successful insurrection to take over power.
- 3- Assure the surprise factor.
- 4- Make maximum efforts to maintain close coordination.
- 5- Correctly determine the objectives of both the US and puppet troops.

Six guidelines.

- 1- Maintain close coordination between counter-attacks and insurrection.
- 2- Maintain close coordination between military, political and proselyting activities.
- 3- Maintain close coordination between activities in the rural areas and cities and towns.
- 4- Maintain solidarity between the North and South Vietnamese and between workers, farmers and soldiers.

Strategem: [Text torn; items missing]

[Page 5 of original text]

Directive for the ideological mission.Our advantages.

- The development of the situation is in our favor.
- From low to high levels, the Party headquarters is always unanimous.
- The strategic determination of the Party.

Our difficulties.

- The [proper] procedures have not yet evolved.
- Rightism still exists.
- [Our] attitude is indecisive.
- Acknowledgement of organizations and discipline is still poor.
- The new mission is the city mission.

Requirements.

- Discuss only necessary matters.

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DD FORM 1396c

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 6 027 0789 68

PAGE 7 OF 7

PAGES

ORIGINATOR

COMUSMACV (CDEC)

(Leave Blank)

CDEC Doc Log No. 01-2286-68

- Conduct an evolution in the internal organization.
- Eliminate rightism.
- Eliminate conservatism [and] narrowmindedness and [develop a] reliant spirit.
- Be brave to [perform] sacrifice [s].
- Ensure leadership
- Carry out the ideological mission.

Contents.

- Fully understand and exactly estimate the enemy and friendly Forces.
- Strictly execute orders.
- Spread out our great victories.
- Concentrate the forces to carry out the armed political mission.
- Understand the [party] policy.

Leadership.

- Fully understand and implement the policies.
- The attitude [in leadership] must be strict and concise.
- Know the ideological situation well.

[Page 6 of original text]

- The party committee echelons must take the command.
- Assault units must be set up and have the responsibility of occupying the targets.
- In cities, we must try to motivate the people by all methods.
- When the people go out, they must be armed.
- We should rapidly occupy key positions; prepare a proper plan for the "three prong" attack and capture important officials when ordered.
- When we encircle the American troops, we must appeal to them to surrender and clarify our objectives.
- We should hunt down reactionaries and tyrants.
- We should rapidly set up political and armed forces.
- We should develop our achievements and maintain the morale of the troops and the people by explaining to them that we fight for liberty and the reunification of our country and that the American troops must withdraw.

3- We should rapidly improve the physical conditions of key cadre by organizing immediate training courses for more cadre and make every endeavor to better the living conditions of the people.

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END OF TRANSLATION

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